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PAST, PRESENT AI!JD PUTURB 
David s. Baron 
I. Ill'l'RODUCI'IOII 
A. A Suamary Of The Clean Air Act Proviaions Relating 
To Urban Air Quality. 
Almost two decades ago, Congress aoved to end chronic 
air pollution problems in the nation's cities by enacting the 
Clean Air Act of 1970 (the Act)~ Pursuant to the Act, the 
United States Environaental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1971 
established national ambient air quality standards (NAAQSs) 
for carbon monoxide (CO), ozone and particulate aatter (PM) 
the pollutants then of •oat concern in urban areas - at 
levels designed to protect the public health and welfare. 36 
Fed. Reg. 22384 (1971) (codified as ••ended at 40 C.P.R. pt. 
SO). The Act required each state to subait to EPA a state 
implementation plan (SIP) designed to ensure attainaent of 
these standards generally within three years, (but in no 
event later than mid-1977), and maintenance of standards 
thereafter. §7410(a)(l). 1 
After many states failed to •eet the deadlines, Congress 
amended the Act in 1977 to provide for new deadlines coupled 
with additional requirements to ensure attainment. The 
1 Unleaa otherwise indicated all section references herein 
are to aections of the Clean Air Act as codified in Title 42 
u.s. Code. 
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amendaents directed the atatea or BPA to identify area• with-
in each atate not aeeting the BAAQSaa auch areas were to be 
designated •nonattainaent • . for each pollutant ezceeding the 
atandarda . l§7407(d) ~ 7501: 43 Pad: Reg: 8962 (1978) ~ In 
1978, EPA identified literally do&ena of citiea aa nonattain-
ment areas, and aany of theae designations continue to thia 
day. 40 c.F.R~ Part 81 (1988). 
The 1977 amendments required the atates to reviae their 
sIPs by January 1, 1979 to provide for attainaent of atan-
dards in each nonattainment area •as expeditiously as practi-
cable," but in the case of health (pri.ary) standards •not 
later than December 31, 1982." f7502(a); Pub. L. So. 95-95, 
§129(c). Such SIP revisions were to meet detailed require-
ments for ensuring attainment set out in Part D of Title I of 
the Act (§§7501-7508, hereinafter 11Part D"). Part D 
required, among· other things, that SIP revisions inventory 
all emissions of violating pollutants and proaise the iaple-
mentation of •all reasonably available control aeaaures as 
expeditiously as practicable." l7502(b). Where llOtor 
vehicles were a major source of the problem, these aeasures 
had to include transportation control aeasusres (TCMs), that 
is, measures to reduce emissions from each vehicle and to 
reduce vehicle traffic. l7410(a)(2)(B); 44 Fed. Reg. 20372, 
. 
20375, 20377 (1979)1 43 FeeL Reg. 21673, 21676-77 (1978). 
Sect ion 7408 (f) (1 ){A) of the Act listed eighteen TCMs that 
were, purauant to BPA guidance docuaents, preauaed to be 
reasonably available. 44 Ped. Reg. 20372, 20377 (1979): 43 
Ped. Reg. 21673, 21676-77 (1978) : These included progralls 
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for: automobile emissions inspection and aaintenance (I/M); 
iaproved public transit: exclusive bus and carpool lanes: 
parking controls: bikeways and pedestrian &ones: ataggered 
work hours: and trip reduction prograas~ l7408(f)(l)(A) : 
Part D further required that SIP provisions be adopted 
by the states in such a aanner as to be legally enforceable 
and include commitaents of the financial and aanpower 
-resources necessary for iapleaentation. l7502(b)(7) • (10)~ 
EPA was to review the SIPs when subaitted and approve or 
disapprove them. 1§7410, 7502. If EPA approved all or part 
of the plan then the approved portions of the plan becaae 
federally enforceable, both by EPA and by citizen suit. 
§§7413, 7604(a), (f). If a state failed to aubait a plan or 
revision containing all of the required provisions and 
commitments, EPA was mandated to promptly promulgate its own 
plan (or part thereof) within six aonths to correct the 
deficiency. §§7410(c)(l), 7502(b)(l). States lacking 
adequate plans were also subject to termination of federal 
highway assistance (§7506(a)) and a ban on construction of 
new major sources of the violating pollutant 
(f7410(a)(2)(I)). 
For co and ozone nonattainaent areas, Part D aade 
limited provision for extension of the 1982 attainment dead-
line to December 31, 1987. l7502(a){2). BPA could grant 
such eatensions only if the atate deaonatrated in its 1979 
plan that attainaent by the end of 1982 would be iapo•sible 
despite iaplementation of all reasonably available aeasures. 
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~· Extension areas had to submit an additional SIP revision 
by July 1, 1982 providing any further aeaaurea Decessary· to 
ensure attainaent by the •aoat ezpecUtious date possible" 
including •[c]oaprehensive public transportation aeaaures to 
aeet basic transportation needs~" i7502(ch Pub~ L~ 95-95, 
ll29(c) (reprinted as note to 17502): 46 !'ed: Reg~ 7185-86 
(1981). 
B. The Post-1977 Experience. 
State and local governments quickly fell behind the 
schedules set by Congress in the 1977 Aaen4aents. Moat 
states failed to subait their 1979 SIP revisions on tiae, and 
many others submitted plans that were inadequate to ensure 
attainment. See Reed, Marking Tiae: A Status Report on the 
Clean Air Act Between Deadlines, 15 Envtl. L. Rptr. 10022, 
Despite these widespread failures, 
EPA avoided imposing federal iapleaentation plans and sanc-
tions by delaying plan disapprovals and offering states 
additional time to correct deficiencies. Although EPA 
initially did impose the construction ban on areas that 
failed to submit tiaely revisions in 1979, the ban was subse-
quently lifted in many areas as a result of the Agency•a 
"conditional" approval policy - a policy whereby SIPs with 
"ainor" deficiencies were deeaed approved. ~Reed at 
10026. ~o circuits specifically upheld BPA 1 s use of condi-
tional approval, connecticut Fund for the Bnvironaent v. EPA, 
672 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1982): City of . Seabrook v. u.s.E.P.A., 
659 1'.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981), although the Second Circuit 
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held that a conditional approval could DOt act to lift the 
construction ban. 
Aa 1987 approached, ZPA still bad not finally approve4 
or disapproved the 1979 SIP revisions for aany cities~ In 
other urban areas, it was becoaing rea4ily apparent that 
previous plans were either not being iapleaented or were 
grossly inadequate to ensure attainaent and aaintenance of 
standards. Paced with the prospect of widespread noncom-
pliance with the 1987 deadline, ZPA proposed a •post-1987" 
policy whereby states would be given several acre years to 
again revise their urban SIPs, and three to five years there-
after to attain the standard. 52 Fed. Reg. 40544 (1987). 
EPA has still not taken final action to adopt this policy, 
perhaps in the expectation that Congress will shortly rewrite 
the Clean Air Act to grant the cities more time. 
c. The Rising Tide of Citizens Suits. 
Citizens suits have always played a pivotal role in 
implementation and enforcement of the Act. · During the 
1970's, suits by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
and other groups were instrumental in forcing EPA disapproval 
of inadequate SIPs and the imposition of federal iapleaenta-
tion plans in a number of cities. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 
425 P.2d 968 (D.c. Cir. 1973). In the early years after 
enact .. nt of the 1977 Amendments, citizens suits were also 
filed to challenge EPA's conditional approval pulicy, and to 
force PIP promulgation. See, e.g., Connecticut Pund for the 
Bnvironaent, supra: Citizens for a Better Bnvironaent v. 
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costle, 515 F. Supp. 264 (N.D~ Ill. 1981)~ Urban air quality 
litigation thereafter tapered off so-what, perbapa .Sue to 
the ongoing expectation that the Act would again be aaended~ 
By the aid-1980's~ however, citizens groups were again losing 
patience, and returned to the courts in increasing nuabers. 
Citizen suits are now forcing the adoption of draaatic new 
control aeasures in soae of the nation's largeat urban areas : 
An outline of the claims and results in aoae of the aore 
recent cases is provided below. 
II. DY ISSUBS I& UaBAII SIP LI'riGA'l'lC:. 
A. EPA Duty To Set Date Certain For SIP Revision. 
As the end of 1987 approached, it becaae obvious that 
many cities would not aeet the attainment deadline. In 
addition, a number of nonextension cities (i.e., cities with 
1982 attainment deadlines for CO and ozone) had failed to 
timely attain the standards. Despite these failures, EPA 
bal~ed at requiring major SIP overhauls - perhaps hoping that 
Congress would provide some relief. Although the Agency did 
send out a number of letters asking states to revise their 
plans, these "SIP calls" often did not include deadlines or 
specific guidance on additional control strategies needed. 
This approach left aany SIPs in liabo and thwarted citizen 
enforcement efforts. Because the SIPs on the books were 
technically •approved,• the Act's sanctions for planning 
failures arguably could not be invoked. 
'l'he Act requires states to revise their SIPs whenever 
BPA finds that a plan is substantially inadequate to attain 
_,_ 
the standard. i7410(a) (2) (B). SPA's duty to proaulgate a 
federal iaplementation plan (PIP) is triggered if the state 
fails to submit such a revi•ion within 60 days after BPA 
notification of SIP inadequacy, or within •such longer 
period" as EPA aay prescribe; In 1988 the Batural Resources 
Defense Council asked a federal district court to bold that 
EPA had a nondiscretionary duty to notify the State of Hew 
York that its co and ozone SIPs for Hew York City were 
inadequate and require their revi•ion by a date certain : 
NRDC based this request on the fact that B~w York had 
obviously not attained the CO and ozone standards by the end 
of 1987, and that the SIP was therefore by definition 
inadequate. By the time the issue reached the judge, EPA had 
finally notified the state of the need to revise the SIP, but 
had not set a firm due date for the revisions. The court 
held that while EPA • s action 1100ted IIRDC' s request for an 
order requiring notice to the state, the Agency was still 
under a obligation to set a date certain for a SIP revision 
by the state. Batural Resources Defense Council v. New York 
State Department of Environmental Conservation, 700 F. Supp. 
173 (s.o. N.Y. 1988). 
Although the New York District Court did not reach the 
issue of EPA's duty to issue a SIP call, even EPA apparently 
believes that such a duty exists - at least as to cities that 
are still nonattainment after 1987. As noted above, EPA 
issued a SIP call to Hew York before the court even reached 
the issue, and tbe Agency has reacted aiailarly in other 
_,_ 
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citizen suits. For exaaple, in Conservation Law Poundation 
v. State of Massachusetts (D~ Maaa~ filed March 1987), the 
plaintiffs asked that BPA be required to aake an ozone SIP 
call to Massachusetts. In response, EPA did just tbat, 
requiring a SIP revision from the state by Septeaber 1991. 
One issue that these cases do not address is the a.ount 
of time that EPA can legally give states to prepare SIP 
revisions. In light of the fact that the Act allows only 
nine months after the promulgation of an RAAQS for states to 
submit SIPs to attain the BAAQS (§7410(a)(l)), citizens 
groups may argue that nine •onths is the absolute outside 
deadline. 
Suppose a state submits a revision that EPA deems to be 
inadequate? Should the state be given another chance? 
Language in Arizona v. Thomas, 829 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1987) 
suggests not. The court held that because Arizona had 
"failed in its obligation to produce or •ake reasonable 
efforts to produce SIPs which would appear to aeet the 
requirements of the Act," the state •should not be given 
another opportunity to produce more plans.• Id. at 839. 
Although the case involved a challenge to EPA's disapproval 
of a SIP that had previously been conditionally approved, the 
holding aay have broader application. 
B. BPA Duty To Promulgate Pederal Iapleaentation 
Plana. 
~· Act's provisions requiring EPA to proaulgate federal 
iapleaentation plans (PIPs) where states have failed to adopt 
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adequate SIPs are among the aost clearcut requireaents in the 
law. For this reason, citizen-plaintiffs are increasingly 
asking the courts to order PIP proaulgation by BPA in 
nonattainaent areas. 
1. Mandatory Datu.re of cluty& Under f7410(c) (1) 
EPA •• shall'' proaulgate a PIP if the state fails to subait a 
SIP, if EPA disapproves all or part of subaission, or if the 
state fails to tiaely revise the SIP in response to a SIP 
call. The courts have uniformly held that PIP proaulgation 
is mandatory when any of these preconditions have been aet, 
regardless of the technical difficulties or resource liaita-
tions involved. For exaaple, citi&en/plaintiffs in Arizona 
obtained a court order requiring EPA to promulgate co PIPs 
for Phoenix and Tucson despite EPA claias of adainiatrative 
and political difficulties. McCarthy v. Thomas, 17 Envtl. L. 
Rptr. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21214 (D. Ariz. 1987). EPA asserted 
that federal plan promulgation should be required only as •a 
last resort," citing resistance that the Agency encountered 
in promulgating FIPs during the 1970's. The court rejected 
these arguments, holding that the statute was •clear and 
unambigious on its face." Id. at 21216. 
Similarly, a u.s. District Court recently ordered pro-
mulgation of a federal ozone plan for the Chicago area in 
Wisconsin v. Thoaas, 19 Envtl. L. Rptr. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20964 (B.D. Wis. 1989). At the tiae of decision, BPA had 
already 4isapproved the relevant SIPs, and in fact conceded 
its duty to proaulgate a PIP. The Agency apparently nonethe-
-9-
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leas argued that it ahould not be ordered to proaulgate a 
FIP, but the court found that history of planning delays in 
the Chicago areas justified injunctive relief. 
&PA • a duty to commence proaulgation of a PIP is trig-
gered iaaediately upon disapproval of a a tate • s SIP. The 
duty is not stayed by a challenge to the legality of the SIP 
disapproval. Citizens for a Better Bnvironaent · v~ · -coat·l·e·~ 
610 F. Supp. 106 (N~D~ Ill~ 1985): One court has ruled that 
a FIP promulgation duty does not arise aolely froa SPA delay 
in making a SIP call, as long aa the delay ia not •unreason-
able.'' Natural Resources Defense Council v. Bew York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation, 700 P. Supp. 173, 
181-82 (S.D. N.Y. 1988). 
71ael1De for PIP proaalgatiOD: Section 
7410(c) requires EPA to promulgate a PIP within 6 aonths of 
disapproving a SIP subaittal, or of a state's failure to meet 
a SIP submittal deadline. Where a PIP contains any of a 
variety of measures for which the Act requires consultation 
with local governments (e.g., transportation controls, air 
quality maintenance plan requireaenta) as specified in §7421, 
an additional 2 months is allowed. 2 In several recent cases, 
EPA has asked tor 6 months beyond that (for a total of 14 
2 Until very recently, neither EPA nor the courts appeared 
to even be aware of the provision allowing the additional 2 
aontha. The Agency •discovered• the provision in the aidat 
of the Arizona SIP litigation. Ooatare McCarthy v. Thoaas, 
17 Bnvtl. L. Rptr. (&nvtl. L. Inat. 21214, 21211 (D. Ariz. 
1987) with McCarthy v. Thoaaa, 18 Bnvtl. L. Rptr. (&nvtl. L. 




months altogether) under 17607(4)(10) of tbe Act, which 
allows EPA to extend the proposal deadline for certain rules 
where the atatutory deadline for proaulgation is le•s tban 6 
aonths after the date of proposal. However, the legislative 
history of the Act indicates that Congress did not intend 
this additional 6 aontha to be available where BPA wa• 
already being allowed a total of 8 .antha under l7410(c)~ B. 
Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong~ 1st Seas~ 315, reprinted in 1977 
u.s. Code Cong. • Admin~ Rewa 1077, 1394 (1977)~ EPA aought 
a 14 month proaulgation period in the Arizona SIP litigation, 
but the district court held that the Act allowed only 8 
months. McCarthy v. Thoaas, 18 Bnvtl. L. Rptr. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 21025, 21026 (D. Ariz. 1988). The court also rejected 
EPA claims that aore time was needed to do an adequate job~ 
holding that only true iapoasibility would justify an 
ex tens ion of the statutory deadline. ~ In Wisconsin v. 
Thomas, 19 Envtl. L. Rptr. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20964 (E.D. Wis. 
1989), the court allowed a 14 aonth proaulgation period, but 
did so because the plaintiffs stipulated thereto: the court 
did not address whether the Act in fact allowed such a 
tiaeframe. 
3. Recent •ettleaenta: In the past 3 years, 
clean air advocates in California have filed citizen suits in 
five •eparate nonattainaent areas aee'king court-ordered PIP 
proaulgation and other remedies. Settle•ents providing for 
PIP proau1gation have recently been reached in three of these 
cases. In Loa Angeles, EPA has agreed to p~oaulgate carbon 
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aonozide and ozone PIPs by 1991. Coalition for Clean Air v. 
United States Environaental Protection Agency, &o; C88 0540 
EFL (C~D~ Cal~)~ In a citizen suit over the plan for 
Sacraaento, EPA has stipulated to PIP proposal by aid-1991, 
and PIP promulgation by the spring of 1992~ Bnvironaental 
council of Sacramento v~ BPA~ CIVS-87-0420 BJG (a:n~ Cal~); 
And in another citizen suit, BPA has recently stipulated to 
proposal of a PIP for Ventura County (a coastal area just 
Northwest of Los Angeles) by Septeaber 1990, and final PIP 
proaulgation by July 1991. Citizens to Preserve the Ojai v. 
EPA, No. cv-88 00982 HLH (c.o. Cal.). Under all of these 
settlements, EPA will be relieved of its FIP proaulgation 
duty if the state submits an approvable plan before the PIP 
proaulgation deadline. In addition, BPA has reserved the 
right to seek nullification of all or part of each settlement 
based on any subsequent Clean Air Act aaendaents that aight 
be passed. 
4. Pending cases: There are at least two pending 
PIP promulgation suits in California that have not yet been 
resolved. Citizens for a Healthy Environment v. EPA. 
CVF-89-399 REC (E.D. Cal. filed 1989) (seeking proaulgation 
of a FIP for Kern and Fresno Counties); Citizens for a Better 
Environment v. Deukaejian, No. C 89 2044 TEH (N.D. Cal. filed 
1989) (seeking PIP proaulgation, sanctions, and SIP iaple-
aentation in the San Francisco area). 
c. Attainaent Deadlines. 
By 1987, aany cities were so far behind in the adoption 
-12-
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of control measures that attainaent by the deadline waa 
either unlikely or iapoaaible~ When presented with a SIP 
revision for Loa Angeles that failed to provide for attain-
aent of the CO and ozone atandarda~ EPA sought to avoid the 
issue by simply approving the control aeaaures in the plan 
without approving or disapproving the plan overall~ In 
response to a citizen petition, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
this result, holding that EPA did not have the discretion •to 
ignore the statutory deadline.• Abraaowitz v~ U~S~ EPA, 832 
F. 2d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 1987). bphasizing the central 
role of the attainment deadlines under the Act, the court 
ordered EPA to disapprove the Los Angeles plan (setting the 
stage for the FIP litigation discussed above). 
In the absence of aaendments to the Clean Air Act, the 
next deadline issue will be how quickly states aust attain 
now that the 1987 deadline has passed. In a pending action 
in the Ninth Circuit, citizens are challenging EPA's approval 
of Arizona's carbon monoxide SIP which does not provide for 
attainment until the end of 1991. Delaney v. Thoaas, No. 
88-7368, (argued June 26, 1989). Petitioners contend that, 
once the attainment deadline has passed, SIPs aust provide 
for attainment at the earliest possible date using every 
available control aeasure. They argue that the Arizona SIP 
does not aeet this standard, because the plan fails to co .. it 
to adoption of aeasures that the state itself identified as 
likely to advance the attainment date. BPA contends that SIP 
-13-
'- ----... ·~- .. ·- ---·-
revisions submitted after the 1987 deadline need only provide 
for attainaent within three to five years of plan approval 
. 
and need only eaploy •reasonably available• control aeaaurea. 
This position, which is also reflected in a 1987 national 
policy proposal by the Agency (52 Ped; Reg~ 45044 1987)~ is 
baaed on an analogy to provisions of the original 1970 Clean 
Air Act whereby states were given three to five years to 
attain standards. 
D. Maintenance. 
The Act requires that SIPs provide not only for attain-
ment of clean air standards, but also for aaintenance of 
clean air thereafter. ll7410(a)(l), 7502(a)(l). EPA has 
recently taken the position that it will approve SIP revi-
sions as long as they provide for maintenance for at least 10 
years after submittal of the revision • ..!.!.!._52 Fed. Reg. 
45045, 45080 (1987). The petitionera in Delaney v. Thomas, 
supra, are arguing that a 10 year aaintenance demonstration 
is not sufficient, based on EPA regulations adopted in the 
1970 • s requiring at least a 20 year maintenance demonstra-
tion. 40 C.F.R. §51.42. 
E. Failure Of States To Implement SIP Coamitaents. 
In addition to seeking adoption of tougher plana, 
citizens groups are pressing for enforceaent of coaaitaents 
aade by state and local governaents in already-approved SIPs 
and SIP revisions. The Act's citizen suit provision allows 
citizens to seek judicial enforceaent of any •eaiasion 
standard or liaitation• under the Act: a term that is 
-14-
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defined to include a wide variety of SIP provisions and 
coaaitaenta. lf7604{a)(l), (f)(3). Soae of the aajor issues 
raised in these cases are outlined below~ 
1. lbaforceability of SIP ca..it.eata& In several 
of recent cases, citizens groups have been successful in 
enforcing broadly phrased state coaaitaenta to adopt regula-
tory programs despite state objections that the co .. itaents 
were too vague to be enforceable. In New Jersey, advocacy 
groups obtained a fairly sweeping court order requiring the 
state to adopt emission control regulations for seven aajor 
categories of activities including gas stations, barge 
loading of gasoline, aolvent-based consumer products, and 
various manufacturing operations. Although the SIP provided 
for these programs, the state argued that the SIP iapleaenta-
tion schedules were by their terms only "projected" and were 
never meant to be binding. The court coapletely rejected the 
claim, holding that "a state cannot use ita SIP to write 
around the aandatory requirements iapoaed by the Act." 
Because the Act requires that SIP provisions be legally 
enforceable, the court held that it would not •read aabiguity 
into the document to make it say leas than the law requires." 
American Lung Association of New Jersey v. ~ean, 670 F. Supp. 
1285, 1291 (D. N.J. 1987), affiraed, 871 F .2d 319 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
In Atlantic Terainal Urban Area Renewal coalition v. Hew 
York City Department of Bnvironaental Protection, 697 F. 
Supp. 157 (S.D. &.Y. 1988), the court found to be enforceable 
-15-
a SIP coamitaent by the City of Bew York to aaaure that 
unspecified aitigating aeasures would be lapleaented in 
connection with urban renewal projects to provide for attain-
ment of clean air atandards by the deadline~ ~e court 
rejected claims by the city that the SIP proviaion waa aerely 
an unenforceable goal, finding that it conatituted •a coaait-
aent on the part of the City to act~· Id: at 162~ But ·aee - -
Wilder v. Thomas, 659 F. Supp~ 1500, 1506 (S~D~ a:y: 1987), 
affirmed 854 F.2d 605 (2d Cir: 1988) (holding that a SIP 
commitment siaply to attain the atandard was not 
enforceable). 
Environmental groups in San Francisco recently obtained 
a court order requiring iaplementation of SIP co .. itaents to 
set emission limits on a wide range of VOC aources and to 
develop new transportation control aeasurea to assure steady 
progress toward attainment. 
Environment v. Duekaejian, supra. 
Citizens for a Better 
2. Strict liability for coapliaDce: Citizens 
groups have generally been successful in enforcing SIP 
commitments despite state claias that coapliance would be 
economically or technically infeasible. In HRDC v. New York 
State Departaent of Environmental Conservation, 668 F. Supp. 
848 (S.D. &.Y. 1987), the court ordered New York to adopt an 
extenaive •et of rules governing volatile organic coapound 
eaiaaiona baaed on SIP co .. itaenta aiailar to those in New 
Jer••Y· Tbe court expressly rejected a request by the state 
that it be allowed to deaonatrate the infeasibility of 
-16~ 
compliance, holding that the Act iapoaed atrict liability for 
coapliance with the SIP and that the atate'a only reaedy 
would be to seek BPA approval of SIP .edification•~ ~· very 
same conclusion was reached by the court in .,!!!tr1can Lung 
Association v~ Jtean, 18 Bnvtl. L~ ltptr: (BDvtl~ L~ Inst:) 
20317, 20318-19 (D~ B~J~ 1987) : 
3. Court ordered co.pllaac:e acbedulea: Where the 
deadlines for iapleaenting SIP coaaitaents have passed, how 
quickly should states be required to reaedy the situation? 
The courts will generally ask for proposed coapliance 
schedules from the parties and pick the earliest achievable 
dates. The decisions do offer some guidelines: 
the court order should provide for SIP iapleaenta-
tion •as expeditiously as practicable.• American Lung 
Association v. Kean, 18 Envtl. L. Rptr. at 20317r 
the court order aust incorporate final coapliance 
dates. NRDC v. New York State Departaent of Environaental 
Conservation, 668 F. Supp. at 855; 
the federal court can order the bypassing of usual 
state procedures to expedite coapliance. Id.; 
inconvenience and expense does not justify a aore 
protracted coapliance schedule. ~.; 
the state•a duty to coaply with the SIP is not con-
tingent on continued violation of the aiDbient air quality 
standard. American Lung Association v. Kean, 670 F. Supp. 
1285 (D. a.J. 1987). 
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F. Sanctions. 
1. Highway fund cutoff. 
In urban nonattainaent areas where tran•portation con-
trols are needed to attain the standard, BPA aust initiate a 
cutoff of federal highway assistance where the Agency •finds• 
that the state has not subaitted an adequate Part D plan •or 
that reasonable efforts towards subaitting •uch an iapleaen-
tation plan are not being aade.• l7506(a)~ EPA takes the 
position that these requireaents aust be read conjunctively, 
and that a fund cutoff is aandated only if the Agency finds 
both that a state plan is inadequate ~ that the state is 
not making reasonable efforts to correct the deficiencies. 
Because EPA almost never finds a lack of reasonable efforts, 
the highway fund cutoff bas very rarely been iaposed. 
EPA•a reading of the statute was upheld in McCarthy v. 
Thomas, 17 Envtl. L. Rptr. at 21214-16. Tbere, EPA had dis-
approved the Arizona SIP but had not aade a finding of lack 
of reasonable efforts. The court found the statute and leg-
islative history to be aabigious on whether this would aan-
date a fund cutoff, and therefore deferred to the Agency 
interpretation. Language in a Tenth Circuit opinion suggests 
the opposite result. In upholding an BPA ordered highway 
fund cutoff in ~a~ M~:icc, the court e&preaaly noted that the 
statute was written in the disjunctive, and that •either• a 
finding of lack of reasonable efforts or a plan disapproval 
would trigger the sanction. Sew Mexico Bnvironaental 
Iaproveaent Division v. Tboaas, 789 P.2d 825, 833 (lOth Cir. 
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1986). In a Pennsylvania case, a diatrict judge iapoaed the 
highway fund cutoff as a aanction for the state's noncoa-
pliance with a consent decree entered into with a citisena 
group. Delaware ·valley ·c1tizen• Council v: · Penn•xlvania~ 533 
F. Supp~ 869 (E~D~ Pa; 1982)~ The court iaposed the fund 
cutoff as a conteapt sanction, drawing tbe idea from 
§7506(a), but did not hold that a cutoff was aandated by the 
statute . 
2. Conatruction banz EPA has long taken the 
position that tbe construction ban on new aajor aources of 
pollution takes effect autoaatically whenever BPA disapproves 
a SIP. Accordingly, citizens groups seeking iaposition of 
the construction ban have generally sought to force EPA 
disapproval of the SIP. The construction ban aust also be 
imposed where a state is failing to iapleaent its SIP. 
§7503 (l) (B) (4). Clean air advocates in San Francisco are 
currently seeking iaposition of the construction ban on this 
latter basis. Citizens for a Better Environment v. 
Deukmejian, supra. 
(3.2) 
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